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I. Introduction

The awesome capability to intervene at the beginning of human life through medicine--to actually
enable the creation of life and choices about human characteristics--has burgeoned in recent years and
continues to expand at an ever-quickening pace. [FN1] Assisted reproduction technology (ART) has
become an increasingly accessible means for prospective parents to realize parenthood when
confronting human health impediments--overcoming infertility, or avoiding an identifiable genetic risk
or health impairment. Assisted reproduction (AR), which is carried out in the United States
predominantly in hundreds of private, independent clinics, has become a vibrant, highly competitive
business that markets itself aggressively and generates billions of dollars annually. [FN2]
The revolution in human reproduction through AR (reproduction *550 revolution) is broadening
parental choice about whether to have children and what genetic characteristics those children will or
will not have. [FN3] This reproduction revolution and the genomics revolution, both ongoing and raging,
are becoming intertwined through the use of AR technologies. [FN4] Colleagues have termed the nexus
“reprogenetics.” [FN5] Professor John Robertson, a visionary immersed in the law and policy aspects of
AR and genomics, has predicted our society's destiny in reprogenetics. As observed by Professor
Robertson, “Ultimately, decisions about how to use or not use genomics in human reproduction will be
determined, not by biologic necessity or evolutionary theory, but by how those uses fit into the fabric of
rights and interests of individual and social choice and responsibility that particular societies recognize.”
[FN6]

The objective of this Article is to question the role of regulation in the field of AR at the present time and
over the next several years as the genomics and AR revolutions continue to intensify and integrate. Part
II discusses the extent to which AR is a distinguishable field of medicine, and does so from the often
conflicting perspectives of patient, provider, and payer. Part III probes the United States' unique level of
acceptance of AR among industrialized countries, attributable largely to a trilogy of deferences: to
human reproduction, to the physician's discretion to practice medicine, and to physician-patient
decision making. The Article concludes *551 that assurance of good medical practices and public
accountability through regulation are at least as desirable in AR as in most other areas of medicine.
Proposals for regulatory reform include a comprehensive, national licensing requirement for all AR
services and the establishment of a federal overseeing authority.

II. Distinguishing Features of AR as a Field of Medicine

AR is generally performed as a medical clinical service, [FN7] and the Food and Drug Administration's
jurisdiction historically has been checked not to interfere with physician discretion to practice medicine.
[FN8] In fact, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA) [FN9] expressly
provides: “In developing the certification program, the Secretary [of the Department of Health and
Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, or requirement which has the effect of
exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive technology
programs.” [FN10] Consequently, the United States' federal regulation consists almost entirely of selfregulation through a program of voluntary reporting and certification. [FN11] The federal system rests
largely upon the FCSRCA, pursuant to which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
developed a model certification program for AR laboratories. [FN12] The CDC has contractually
outsourced implementation of its responsibilities *552 under the FCSRCA to the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology (SART) and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM). [FN13]
Most AR providers belong to these organizations and report data to them voluntarily. SART-ASRM then
collects, processes, and submits the data to the CDC, which in turn processes that data in a standard
format and issues reports annually for public dissemination. [FN14] In addition to the CDC, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction to police marketing claims and has used that authority to
investigate some AR providers. [FN15] Some states have done the same. [FN16]
This author [FN17] and others, including Professor Lars Noah, [FN18] Erik Parens and Lori Knowles,
[FN19] and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), [FN20] have questioned the sufficiency of this
voluntary reporting, self-regulation system in the field of AR. [FN21] The FCSRCA did not even introduce
a mandatory mechanism to report adverse events associated with fertility treatments, [FN22] and the
CDC performs site visits on fewer than ten percent of AR clinics. [FN23] *553 Moreover, states “have
failed to offer much direct regulation of fertility clinics.” [FN24] As summarized by the FDA:
The model certification program for embryo laboratories developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) is a voluntary program that States may or may not choose to adopt; its primary

focus is not on preventing the transmission of communicable disease. No State has yet adopted CDC's
model certification program. Membership in professional societies is voluntary. Moreover, many
establishments do not report to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology. [FN25]

A. Existing AR Features
Several features of AR support more direct government regulation by the United States. First, the three
primary patient groups at issue--prospective parents, pregnant women, and the unborn--are
exceptionally vulnerable, and two of these groups (pregnant women and the unborn) have been
deemed as such under the Common Rule for the protection of human subjects. [FN26] Second, rapidly
emerging technology, experimentation, and the practice of medicine are inherently mixed in AR--much
more so than in most other fields of medicine. Novel techniques are often practiced in AR without the
prerequisite of sufficient animal studies and human subjects protection oversight. [FN27] Examples
include discovery and clinical use of *554 intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI); [FN28] cytoplasmic
transfer; [FN29] in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation (IVONT); [FN30] and administering extraordinarily
high doses of hormones to premenopausal women to impregnate them, even while physicians are being
warned to administer only mild doses of estrogen to postmenopausal women, and just when most
needed. [FN31] Nevertheless, the field of AR largely circumvents the United States' regulations to
protect human subjects because the experimentation generally is deemed an extension of clinical
service and is not carried out for product review and approval by the FDA. [FN32] “And since [new
interventions in the field] are presented as innovative clinical practice rather than as research, oversight
of *555 them is left to the discretion of the individuals or institutions offering them.” [FN33]
A third feature necessitating more government regulation is that the majority of AR patients pay out-ofpocket, which means that standard accountability and good medicine checks on clinical practice through
third-party payer scrutiny generally do not pertain. [FN34] Fourth, commercial influences, including
aggressive direct-to-consumer (DTC) marketing, are intense in AR and carried out regionally, nationally,
and even internationally. [FN35] Much of the marketing data equates “success” with live births,
regardless of whether those births are seriously premature or suffer serious health problems. [FN36]
Fifth, a significant increase in multiple births, associated with premature delivery and health
impairments, has already been attributed to AR services. [FN37]

B. AR in the Future
When considering the role of regulation in AR at the present time and over the next several years, the
distinguishing features of AR must be thought through in the context of ongoing trends in biomedical
research and development (R&D). These trends include the mission to make medical sense out of the
map of the human genome; the extraordinary and ongoing commercial, governmental, and academic
investment to accomplish that mission; and the voluminous and amassing power of bioinformatics.
[FN38] The considerable genotype-phenotype connections (connections between genetic characteristics
and physical/mental characteristics) being generated by the *556 “genomics revolution” must be taken

into consideration. [FN39] Although the vast majority of these genotype-phenotype connections are
subtle in the context of human health and even negligible for contemporary clinical health application,
the capability to test for large numbers of them simultaneously is becoming remarkably easier. [FN40]
As clusters of bits of information become larger, cheaper, and collectively more medically meaningful,
presumably so will their appeal to patient-consumers. [FN41]
Many predict that consumer-driven medicine is the emergent post-managed care era in United States
medicine. [FN42] Certainly a reasonable amount of faith must be placed in the judgment of the patientconsumer in the United States to make responsible decisions about the use of AR and health care in
general. Nevertheless, medicine, and medical technology in particular, cannot be equated with standard
commodities like groceries, clothes, and entertainment. [FN43] As explored fully in legal literature-especially comparative health law literature--patients are not typical consumers, and health care is not a
typical product or commodity. [FN44] Innovative medical *557 technologies that require more expertise
to assess and are promoted through aggressive DTC marketing exacerbate these differences. A recent
illustration is the patients' purchase of billions of dollars worth of prescription Vioxx and other Cox-2
inhibitors through providers as an alternative to ibuprofen--a drug that was familiar and tested through
use over time, available over the counter at a fraction of the cost, and now has been proven to be
equally or even more effective for most patients and with significantly less risk. [FN45]
When considering the role of regulation in the AR context, one must embrace the health care realities of
patient and provider, and with sensitivity for the distinguishing features of the practice of AR addressed
above. [FN46] In addition to the capacity to generate genetic information, the genomics revolution
encompasses fields such as stem cell research and provides an understanding of cellular differentiation
and genetic expression, resulting in immeasurable potential for human health application. [FN47] Given
the distinguishing features of AR, AR providers will be at least as tempted and as likely as other
physicians to apply emerging technology prematurely, and in a manner that risks deviation from good
medicine practices and detraction from the quality of care. [FN48]
It is highly likely that the genomics revolution will intensify the appeal of AR as a consumer product by
adding considerably more information at nominal additional cost to services presently rendered. From
the patient's perspective, imagine being desperate to have a child, [FN49] frustrated and pressured by
time, worrying to the point of being willing to spend tens of thousands of dollars, perhaps exhausting
savings and mortgaging a home, and undergoing invasive procedures, all for a thirty to thirty-five
percent chance of success. [FN50] If extensive multiplex genetic testing for relatively *558 nominal
additional cost means considerably more information about a pregnancy, even if that information is
generally hazy at best and of questionable medical utility, the temptation to opt for more information is
understandable. AR providers could enhance that appeal by packaging the extra information as an
added value. From the patient's perspective, given the element of desperation associated with most AR
services, more information about the medical status of embryos and pregnancies is likely to be
perceived as preferable, especially in light of limited patient-consumer capabilities to meaningfully
assess and process that information. From an AR provider's perspective, offering patients more medical
information and, specifically, genetic information [FN51] for a relatively nominal extra cost, even if the

information is of marginal clinical utility, means more market appeal in the highly competitive
commercial AR sector--a sector marketing aggressively for patients. [FN52]

III. A Proposal for Public Accountability in AR

The United States' approach to health care--in essence, heavy dependence on the private sectors and no
universal system to ensure a baseline of care for all--is readily distinguishable among developed
economies. [FN53] The implications for the roles of payer, provider, and patient are extensive. [FN54]
Arguably, especially for areas of medicine with relatively profound social, ethical and legal implications,
the United States' privatized approach sometimes necessitates targeted government regulation to
ensure collection of information routinely gathered by governments acting as payers and
comprehensive health care overseers in universal health care systems. [FN55] Presumably this need is
underscored in highly sensitive areas of medicine that also fall into the extreme range of privatization,
such as AR in the United States. [FN56]
*559 Experience with AR elsewhere in the world is extensive enough to, at the very least, provide a
means for drawing comparisons--comparisons made with appreciation for the distinguishing features of
the United States' health care system that enable thoughtful questioning about the fundamental role of
government regulation in AR. Virtually all industrialized nations offer meaningful access to AR but with
more direct government regulation and comprehensive oversight, even when considerable AR services
are provided through private health care. [FN57] “Increasingly, countries are attempting to create
statute-based regulatory schemes that regulate either the entire assisted reproduction technology (ART)
enterprise or large portions of it.” [FN58] A common denominator is regulation to ensure
comprehensive screening of donated sperm and ova to protect against HIV and other diseases. [FN59] In
addition to assurance of public safety and good medical practice, most other industrialized nations
check the goal of assistance in adult procreation with measures to promote public accountability--for
example, conclusive AR licensing requirements for all service providers. [FN60] Perhaps most notably,
from 1982 to 1984 the United Kingdom (U.K.) engaged in public debate and deliberation--which,
incidentally, expressly recognized the entanglement of human embryonic research and infertility
services [FN61]--through the work of the Warnock Committee. [FN62] For the next six years, Parliament
considered the Committee's sixty-four recommendations *560 in deliberations open to the public, and
these deliberations resulted in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (hereinafter the Act) of
1990. [FN63] The Act introduced statutory regulations governing donor insemination, in vitro
fertilization, and embryonic research, and the United Kingdom established the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) to implement it. [FN64] Foremost, the Act requires licensing for all AR
services to ensure government oversight and public accountability. [FN65] In 2001, Parliament
broadened the HFEA's enabling legislation to allow research that derives human embryonic stem cells
(hESC) to explore therapeutic properties. [FN66]

As an extension of regulating AR for accountability, the United States' industrialized counterparts have
defined and codified a varied set of principles to govern AR. [FN67] Approaches to AR are intentionally
value-laden, and as varied as the cultures of the countries themselves. For example, the U.K. has
adopted a primarily child-oriented perspective. [FN68] The country has placed restrictions on the use of
AR to protect the interests of the potential child, including checks on parental screening and limitations
on prospective parents' access to donor information which could impose expectations on children
created with AR. [FN69] In contrast, Canada's perspective has been primarily parent-oriented. [FN70]
The country involves the law to protect prospective parents from discrimination based upon family
status, marital status, or sexual orientation. [FN71]
Similarly, countries vary immensely in terms of practical access to AR *561 services. [FN72] For example,
the French have imposed stringent standards on access in favor of heterosexual couples seeking to
realize a conventional nuclear family structure, but, where those criteria are satisfied, there is
meaningful access. [FN73] In comparison with France, the U.K. favors physician discretion rather than
prescribed, rigid standards. [FN74] However, U.K. physicians must and do take funding limitations into
account, for local health authorities adhere to budgets and generally limit allocation of resources for AR
services. [FN75] A common denominator among the U.K., France, and Canada is that both public and
private providers of AR services are directly regulated by, and accountable to, government entities
through licensing and reporting requirements. [FN76]
What makes the United States so different--so relatively willing to leave AR to self-regulation by the
medical profession and largely unrestrained for those with the financial means to procure AR services?
The United States' position on AR is as value-laden as those of its industrialized counterparts, and
several sociocultural influences are responsible for the United States' unique level of acceptance of AR.
The United States' approach is multifaceted and shaped largely by a trilogy of deferences. The approach
encompasses the parent perspective through high deference to human reproduction, and then adds
additional dimensions of deference to patient-doctor decision making and physicians' discretion to
practice medicine.
For more than a quarter of a century, United States jurisprudence has recognized and protected
procreative liberty expansive enough to encompass decisions to terminate pregnancies for any reason
prior to viability of the fetus. [FN77] Today, in spite of anxiety over research that destroys embryos and
use of cloning in human reproduction, [FN78] procreation, with or without AR, generally is embraced
and largely shielded from the intrusion of law to the point of making government accounting and public
accountability dependent *562 upon voluntary reporting. [FN79] As observed by Professor Robertson:
It is not surprising that an interlocking set of laws, norms and practices exist that support reproduction.
Deeply engrained social attitudes and practices celebrate the importance of family and children. Laws,
ethical norms, and institutions protect and support human desires to have or avoid having offspring, and
the rearing that follows. The deep psychological commitment one has to the well-being of one's
offspring is reflected in the strong family and constitutional law protections for rearing rights and duties
in biologic offspring, in special tort damages for the loss of children and parents, in the law of rape, in
the rise of an infertility industry, and in the wide acceptance of prenatal screening programs for the

health of offspring . . . . Strong protection of procreative liberty and family autonomy in rearing offspring
is yet another way that social recognition of the importance of reproduction is shown. [FN80]
In addition to this psychological, social, and, as many argue, biological drive to embrace human
reproduction, [FN81] the United States also has a rich legacy of deferring to individual doctor-patient
relationships [FN82] and to doctors' discretion to practice medicine. [FN83] Limitations on the FDA's
authority, both under law [FN84] and through FDA self-restraint, [FN85] underscore deference to the
medical profession. [FN86] These deferences under the law--*563 deference to reproduction, doctorpatient decision making, and the discretion to practice medicine without government intrusion-intersect in AR.
Eric Parens, Lori Knowles, and others have emphasized an association between United States oversight
of reproductive medicine and the dynamics of the abortion debate. [FN87] According to Parens and
Knowles, “[t]hose dynamics make policymakers reluctant to engage in a decision about embryo
research.” [FN88] In fact, the more fundamental trilogy of deferences identified above are encompassed
in the United States abortion debate and arguably drive Justice Blackmun's Roe v. Wade opinion. [FN89]
These deferences also transcend the abortion debate and link acceptance of ART with both proponents
and opponents of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Opponents of abortion center on
deference towards reproduction, while proponents advocate individual choice in reproduction, patientdoctor decision making, and the discretion to practice medicine.
Lori Knowles also attributes the United States' warm embrace of ART to “an embedded tradition of
commercialization.” [FN90] According to Professor Knowles:
This [influence] applies to many realms of human reproduction, from sales of ova and commercial
surrogacy, to sales of gender selection technologies and parental DNA testing. Restrictions on
commercialization in the United States are viewed with suspicion as is much government regulation.
Current government restrictions on funding of hESC research continue to be controversial. [FN91]
While faith in market forces and suspicion of government certainly distinguish the United States from
Canada and many European counterparts, the United States is becoming increasingly questioning of
commercial incentives in the context of the delivery of health care, especially with the proliferation of
managed care. [FN92] In fact, managed care and excessive commercialization in the health context,
from the delivery of care to the marketing of pharmaceuticals, is pushing the United States into an era
of consumer-driven medicine. [FN93] Moreover, in biotechnology R&D, where *564 commercialization
has been most embraced in the context of health care, the United States government has been directly
and extensively involved. From the Human Genome Project to the tens of billions of dollars invested in
basic research annually through the National Institutes of Health, the United States government has
been a presence welcomed by academia, industry, patient groups, and the general public. And from the
Federal Technology Transfer Policy introduced in the 1980s to the dramatic expansion of the FDA
through user fees in the 1990s, extensive government regulation has been accepted as the means to
advance the genomics revolution. [FN94] The trilogy of deferences has shielded ART from more

extensive government regulation in spite of the norms of a looming government presence in biomedical
R&D and increasing public discomfort with and suspicion of the commercial sectors in health care.
Proponents of continued reliance on voluntary reporting and self-regulation in AR assert that this
approach is working, that AR is effectively regulated, and that more extensive direct government
regulation of AR would invite intrusion. [FN95] For example, they caution that more direct government
involvement in AR could welcome the codification of subjective values that many of our industrialized
counterparts have engaged in--for example, to favor heterosexual couples seeking to realize a
conventional nuclear family structure while discouraging others. [FN96] This is a valid concern, but the
value our society places on family, and the trilogy of deferences that have proven so influential in the
United States' approach to AR regulation thus far suggest the opposite. Rather, as observed by Professor
Robertson, our society probably will grow even more comfortable with AR over time with increasing
familiarity and expansion of clinical capabilities, especially if there are reliable assurances of good
medicine practices and accountability along the way. [FN97]
The distinguishing features of AR as a field of medicine deserve attention, [FN98] as recognized in a
March 2004 report issued by the President's Council on Bioethics, entitled Reproduction and
Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies. [FN99] The increase of more direct, reliable
government regulation of AR in the United States would, of course, have to *565 be implemented in a
constitutionally sound manner, meaning in a way consistent with recognized rights such as procreative
liberty [FN100] and commercial free speech. [FN101] Any expansion of the role of the FDA could not
transcend checks on the agency's authority that protect the physician's discretion to practice medicine.
[FN102]
An approach proposed by Professors Lori Andrews, Nanette Elster, and others is regulation to raise the
quality of consumer information about AR, thereby heightening consumer awareness and meaningful
choice. [FN103] States may require physicians to provide information about alternatives to abortion and
make women wait days after the delivery of such information before exercising their decision to
terminate a pregnancy, as held by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. [FN104] The
ability to require the delivery of sound medical information about AR services should fit cleanly within
states' discretion. [FN105] Nevertheless, given the regional, national, and significant international scope
of the markets for AR services and the Internet access to those markets that is being exercised by
service providers *566 and patients, a baseline of more meaningful federal oversight is preferable.
[FN106] Any United States federal regulatory approach will have to embody sensitivity to governing
values in the United States--the deferences influencing current law and policy [FN107]--and comply with
constitutional and other restrictions on government involvement. Accordingly, the United States should
adopt a regulatory approach to AR centered on assurance of good medicine and, to the extent possible,
build upon existing regulatory schemes, such as federal oversight of commercial laboratories under the
Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments (CLIA). [FN108]
At the very least, the United States should join its industrialized counterparts and adopt a
comprehensive, national licensing requirement for all AR services that is an extension of the CDC's
model program [FN109] and that draws from the certification of clinical laboratory services under CLIA.

[FN110] As so many other nations have done, and as has been suggested by Erik Parens, Lori Knowles,
and others, the United States should draw from the United Kingdom experience, albeit with focus on
United States law and policy, and work with the driving trilogy of deferences. [FN111] Responsive to the
sensitivities of AR, the United States should establish a committed overseeing authority modeled as a
counterpart to--not a substitute for--the Office of Human Research Protection, which centralizes
oversight of implementation of human research protections in the United States. [FN112] In crafting this
body, the United States also should draw from the HFEA in England and the Reproductive Technology
Accreditation Committee (RTAC) in Australia. [FN113] Unlike the HFEA, and in spite of the inevitable
practical entanglement of AR and human embryonic stem cell research (HESCR), this body should be
focused on AR to avoid commingling the often competing goals of advancing research and patient care,
though their innate entanglement must be constantly recognized and addressed. [FN114]
*567 This approach is responsive to a governing theme of Reproduction and Responsibility. [FN115]
While the Council made some recommendations for studies and data collection, self-regulation by
professional societies, and targeted legislative measures, the overall theme of the report is that there
simply is too much unknown about AR to undertake significant regulatory reform at this time. [FN116]
According to the Council, “[w]ithout the answers to such questions, it would be premature at best to
recommend dramatic legal or institutional changes. Further research and inquiry, and additional
consultations with all those affected, are clearly needed.” [FN117] An alternative conclusion is that,
given the maturity of the AR sector over the last several years and the distinguishing features of AR, it is
irresponsible for the United States government to further delay regulatory reform necessary to ensure
reliable accountability and awareness of what is transpiring in AR in the United States while tens of
thousands of people use AR services on an annual basis. [FN118] Reforms such as those proposed in this
article should be undertaken to move the United States closer to a position of awareness,
accountability, and reliable oversight in AR.

IV. Conclusion

Deference to human reproduction, to physician discretion to practice medicine, and to physician-patient
decision-making have limited direct government regulation of AR in the United States, resulting in
considerable reliance upon self-regulation by those providing AR services. [FN119] This article has
identified features of AR that support meaningful direct government *568 regulation. [FN120] The
present lack of information about AR recognized by the President's Council on Bioethics is unacceptable,
[FN121] especially given the expansive growth of AR over the last several years, the predictability of that
growth years before, and the measures to ensure accountability undertaken by the United States'
industrialized counterparts, such as the United Kingdom's adoption of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act a decade and one-half ago. [FN122]
The United States should join its industrialized counterparts and adopt a comprehensive, national
licensing requirement for all AR services that is an extension of the CDC's Model Program [FN123] and

which draws from the certification of clinical laboratory services under CLIA. [FN124] Reliable
government oversight and full awareness of what is transpiring in AR is a baseline that must be
established now, for the reproduction and genomics revolutions are raging, intensifying, and integrating.
The trilogy of deferences must give way to accountability and assurance of good medicine in the clinical
practice of AR.
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